Is it Ethical to Force Individuals to be Vaccinated for the Greater Good?
- Megan Hannah (25-I6)
- 1 day ago
- 9 min read
Written by: Megan (25-I6)
Designed by: Athens (25-I1)
The ethicality of mandatory vaccines remains a longstanding point of contention, in which the utilitarian principle of the greater good has been perennially pitted against bodily rights. However, the question at hand poses a false dichotomy by purporting that the ethicality of mandatory vaccinations is solely determined by choosing between these two principles. In reality, since ethics refers to the rules of conduct in a particular culture or group recognised by an external source or social system while morals refers to principles or habits relating to right or wrong conduct based on an individual’s own compass of right and wrong, the notion that an action is ethical would only be consistent within a particular society, rather than morally right in a universal sense. Given how ethical judgement regarding mandatory vaccination would ultimately be dependent on where the act is committed and its corresponding ethical frameworks, this debate thus holds limited significance when framed purely in ethical terms.
Instead, analysing this issue in moral terms would be more significant since the debate between utilitarianism and deontology prescribes a common standard of right and wrong for all human beings. In this way, whichever criterion we choose to judge would not be beholden to particularistic rules and norms, but rather, carry significant moral weight in convincing other communities who might not share the same ethical intuitions to follow the recommendations as a matter of moral principle since it appeals to an objective standard of morality.
To this end, I will first advance an argument grounded in act utilitarianism before addressing potential objections, and lastly introducing another argument based on rule utilitarianism. The main argument, which will be presented in syllogistic form, is as follows
P1) Something is ethical if it is for the greater good.
P2) Something is for the greater good if the benefits outweigh the harms.
P3) Forcing individuals to be vaccinated does not have benefits which outweigh the harms.
C1) It is not ethical to force individuals to be vaccinated as it is not for the greater good.
Premise 1 is a key tenet of utilitarianism that stems from the value humans place on consequences in decision-making processes. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits that a “rational principle” is inherent in the human being. In other words, humans are guided by reason and logic and they intuitively assess the benefits and harm of their actions. This extends into moral decision-making: humans utilise consequentialist reasoning to maximise pleasure and minimise pain.
One objection to this view is that we cannot know for certain if any action is for the greater good since we can only at best forecast short-term consequences. However, Ewing argues that this objection will hold against any view which involves the mere consideration of consequences. Since this objection is not given any weight in other decisions we make, it also should not influence moral decision-making for the sake of consistency. Ethical systems should thus be based on consequences that can be humanly foreseen and have the greatest probability of contributing to the greater good.
Furthermore, detractors may also argue that some individuals might not agree with the principle of the greater good as they deem selfish acts as morally justified. However, these people do not necessarily go against the concept of the greater good; rather, their understanding of it is flawed as they might subjectively value their own welfare over the welfare of others. This does not contradict the premise as these detractors hold onto the same intuitions of valuing the greater good, albeit with different conceptions of the hierarchy of utility.
Premise 2 is generally uncontroversial - the greater good is only justified when the aggregation of benefits is sufficient to override that of the harms.
Premise 3 is where the crux of the argument resides, which I will express through a series of equations revolving around the utilitarian calculus.
From premise 1 and 2, the principle of utilitarianism can be explained simply as the view that an action is morally right insofar as it maximises pleasure and minimises pain. Hence, the equation for the utilitarian calculus can be expressed simply as follows:
Net utility = ∑Pleasure - ∑Pain
Based on this formula, many previously believed that vaccinations were ethical since the pleasure brought about by it was thought to outweigh the pain caused by it.
The substantial amount of pleasure brought about by vaccines primarily arises from two mechanisms: The significant reduction of transmission rates and strengthening of herd immunity. The view that vaccinations are effective at mitigating transmissions, particularly in the early stages of a viral outbreak, is often a central argument for the mandatory implementation of vaccinations: a meta-analysis found that the effectiveness of the adenovirus-vectored vaccines against SARS-COV-2 Alpha variant infections was 73%. Thus, since vaccines are perceived to result in tangible benefits in terms of transmission prevention, vaccinations reduce (-) harms (-), thereby resulting in a positive outcome, which is represented by the pleasure gained from vaccinations:
Pleasure gained = Pain prevented
Pleasure gained from vaccination = - (0 - pain from disease)
Another significant argument for vaccinations is its ability to build herd immunity since widespread vaccination makes large swaths of the population immune to a given disease, dramatically reducing the potential to transmit it to others, and ultimately preventing an outbreak from happening. Since vaccinations bring about herd immunity which is able to prevent potential pain from by future diseases, another argument for the pleasure gained from vaccinations is:
Pleasure gained from vaccination = - (0 - potential pain from disease)
Total pleasure gained = Utility of transmission prevention + Utility of future disease prevention
Conversely, the ostensibly low risk of vaccinations is largely attributed to rigorous safety protocols conducted by medical professionals during the manufacturing and development process. In fact, a vaccine must be proven to be safe and effective across a broad population before it will be approved and introduced routinely into a national immunisation programme. Once licensed and put to use, multiple layers of safety surveillance continue as long as the vaccines are distributed. The perception that vaccinations are low-risk leads to a corresponding underestimation of the importance of bodily autonomy: since physical consequences on one’s body are thought to be minimal, the infringement of bodily rights is dismissed as being morally insignificant:
Pain incurred from vaccination = 0 unit pain
Altogether, the people who benefited from transmission prevention are represented by (Population - infected), while (Population) represents the people who benefitted from herd immunity since the whole population was protected. Hence:
[(Population - infected) + population] units of pleasure - (0 unit pain) = ∑Positive utility
In short, it is supposedly moral to force individuals to be vaccinated because the harms of infringing bodily autonomy by implementing mandatory vaccination are negligible in practice, while the benefits are high, which yields a net positive utility.
With regards to the existing utilitarian calculus in support of vaccination, I will now present a series of rebuttals to demonstrate how such a calculus is in fact fundamentally skewed.
Firstly, while many medical professionals herald vaccinations as a panacea for disease prevention and research has supported this notion, there is a significant amount of research that simultaneously cautions the waning efficacy of vaccinations over time. Another meta-analysis by BMC Infectious Disease revealed that vaccine efficacy (VE) against all SARS-CoV-2 infections declined from 83% in the first month after completion of the original vaccination series to 22% at 5 months or longer. Similarly, VE against symptomatic COVID-19 declined from 94% in the first month after vaccination to 64% by the fourth month.
In addition, the benefits of vaccination always have to be measured in terms of expected utility since they are dependent on probabilistic outcomes such as the likelihood of transmission prevention. In contrast, the harms to vaccination are always measured in actualised utility such as immediate physical side effects or infringement of bodily autonomy. As a result, any potential benefit by vaccines is always watered down by the probability multiplier, while the harms by vaccination are always certain. This causes the benefits of vaccinations to be less substantial while the harms retain their full ethical weight.
Despite the narrowing gap between the benefits and harms of vaccinations as outlined above, some would still argue that there are still marginal benefits to vaccination in some cases which necessitate mandatory vaccinations. However, I argue that based on the principle of asymmetry, humans intuitively feel that avoidance of suffering is more important than gaining pleasure, and that they would actively avoid suffering even if an equal amount of pleasure would be given as compensation. In this instance, the ‘suffering’ refers to the loss of personal freedom imposed by mandatory vaccinations. While the value of freedom is subjective, it can be discerned that the value is substantial. For example, prisons are considered to be a punitive punishment simply because it denies freedom to those incarcerated in it. This suggests that freedom has a significant value. Therefore it is generally accepted and intuitive that coercion incurs much suffering, and should only occur if there is a significant difference between the pleasure gained and pain incurred.
Based on the act utilitarianism syllogism, mandatory vaccinations are not ethical as the moral rightness of the action depends on the positive utility it produces in each individual circumstance. However, to establish whether it is ethical for every individual instance of vaccination, it follows that we need to consider whether vaccination would result in the greater good for that particular individual. This requires extensive knowledge of cause and effect and individual circumstances and is an unrealistic moral standard to strive for due to its practical infeasibility and moral inconsistency. In fact, the very notion of mandating vaccination implies that a universal rule which compels vaccination is applied across all individuals. Therefore, I will apply my original act utilitarian argument to another syllogism grounded in rule utilitarianism to show that mandatory vaccination is unethical in every circumstance.
P1) A rule is ethical if it is for the greater good.
P2) Something infringes bodily autonomy when it modifies the body without prior consent.
P3) Mandatory vaccinations involve modifying the body without prior consent.
P4) Mandatory vaccinations infringe bodily autonomy.
P5) A rule permitting infringement of bodily autonomy results in greater harm than positive utility.
P6) A rule infringing bodily autonomy cannot be for the greater good.
P7) A rule mandating vaccination that infringes bodily autonomy is not for the greater good.
C1) Therefore, a rule mandating vaccination is unethical.
Premise 1 is derived from premise 1 of the previous syllogism as any rule would be ethical if it is for the greater good under utilitarian assumptions.
Premise 2 is intuitive - the very concept of bodily autonomy revolves around people having the agency to make choices regarding their body without coercion or violence. Therefore, any modification imposed on their body regardless of whether they consent to it violates bodily autonomy.
Premise 3 is a factual one. While arguments regarding the semantics of this premise have been raised, mandatory vaccinations ultimately entail introducing biological material into the body, which constitutes a biological modification.
If we accept premise 2 and 3, it follows that premise 4 is true since it is logically derived from the aforementioned premises.
To illustrate premise 5, consider the following thought experiment: in order to stop the spread of a deadly disease, the government mandated the removal of one’s eyeballs. Should the government proceed with the treatment due to utilitarian benefits, this would result in a loss of public trust due to the invasive and violent nature of the procedure, which could potentially lead to distrust in the system and subsequent resistance towards future medical intervention. Moreover, this establishes a dangerous precedent for the state to continually violate individuals’ bodies under utilitarian justification, which could lead to further mistrust and societal instability.
Based on our current intuition regarding the positive utility of medical intervention, peoples’ eyeballs should be removed because it would serve the greater good. However, most people’s moral intuitions would reject this because the cost of bodily autonomy is too high due to the grotesque process of the removal of eyeballs. Thus, this thought experiment shows that our intuitions about mandatory medical intervention are circumstantial because they are heavily influenced by how visceral and immediate the harms are, and demonstrates that infringing bodily autonomy results in both individual and societal harms that outweigh utilitarian benefits.
Since an act cannot be for the greater good if the harms outweigh the benefits (as can be seen from premise 2 of the first syllogism), premise 6 which states that infringing bodily autonomy cannot be for the greater good must be true.
Premise 7 can be rationally inferred from premises 4 and 6. In this way, we arrive at the sound conclusion that mandatory vaccinations are unethical from a rule utilitarian perspective.
In conclusion, it is unethical to force individuals to be vaccinated because the harms do not outweigh the benefits, and it does not consistently produce positive utility. Instead of superficially weighing the harms and benefits with a flawed calculus, we must work on adopting a more nuanced ethical framework - one that takes into account autonomy, consent and rights.
Works Cited
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by W.D. Ross. Canada: Batoche Books, 1999. Print.
“Ethical Issues and Vaccines“. History of Vaccines. Web. May 6. 2025.
Ewing. A.C. “Utilitarianism”. Ethics. 58.2. 100-111. Jstor. Web. May 6. 2025.
“How are Vaccines Developed and Produced?” World Health Organisation. 25 February. 2025. Web. May 6, 2025. https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/manufacturing-safety-and-quality-control
Marcelin, Jasmine R. Pettifor, Audrey. Janes, Holly. Brown, Elizabeth R. Kublin, James G. Stephenson, Katheryn E. Covid-19 Vaccines and SARS-CoV-2 Transmission in the Era of New Variants: A Review and Perspective. National Library of Medicine. Web. May 6, 2025. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8992234/
“Myths & Facts about COVID-19 Vaccines” CDC. Web. 6 May, 2025.
Ssentongo, Paddy. Ssentongo, Anna E. Voleti, Navya. Groff, Destin. Sun, Ashley. Ba, Djibril M. Nunez, Jonathan. Parents, Leslie J. Chinchilli, Vernon M. Paula’s, Catharine I. “SARS-CoV-2 vaccine effectiveness against infection, symptomatic and severe COVID-19: a systematic review and meta-analysis” BMC Infectious Diseases. 7 May. 2022. Web. 6 May. 2025. https://bmcinfectdis.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12879-022-07418-y
“The Relationship Between Vaccines and Herd Immunity”. Columbia University Irving Medical Center. April
9. 2021. Web. May 6, 2025. https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/news/relationship-between-vaccines-herd-immunity
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