What is Morality in Conflict?

Written by: Teong Chee Kai (23-O4)

Designed by: Loo Hao Zhe (23-U2)

What is morality in conflict? Patton famously said, “The point of war is not to die for your own country, but make the other b*stard  die for his”. Imagine yourself mouldering in a soiled trench, would you care about the well-being of that foreign man across the ruins? The same man and his peers, who are the only thing standing between you and home. The same can be said for him. 

When conflicts are initiated, acumen directed to violence, and mortality sacrificed for territorial aggrandizement, where is that line to be drawn? That line distinguishing right from wrong, distinguishing advantage from cruelty, distinguishing criminals and war heroes. 

Amidst modern conflicts, be it those in Yemen, Syria or even the special military operation in Ukraine, what is the argument for morality? After all, when the only constant is talk of atrocities, death counts and hopeless rhetoric, what space is there for even the most sanguine of individuals to even hold the belief that war is in some form or another moral in its own right? While war juxtaposed with contemporary living is often deemed barbaric, individuals such as Clausewitz and Tsun Zu have often argued as to how conflict can be seen as the epitome of societal expression. This take is often enforced with considerable developments in morality or so often, immorality. Wars occur when emotions boil over – they represent the epitome of humanity; fear, caution, and avarice. 

Many have often pointed to international treaties and conventions as a definition of objective morality. These include the Geneva Conventions, SALT treaties as well as the Ottawa treaties, however, one has to acknowledge the limitations of international law. What is established might not be the same as what is objectively acceptable.

While yes, international treaties do uphold largely recognised values such as the protection of civilians and war prisoners, such treaties often fail to enforce the upholding of such values in the heat of the moment. Sentiments such as those of “Geneva Suggestion” and “it isn't a war crime if you win the war / there is no official war”, while crude, are all but too common amongst online discourse and debate over international law. International law is also subjected to the participation of major belligerents. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Ottawa Treaty (banning Anti-Personnel mines) while aiming to minimise unnecessary and indiscriminate weapons, are but one of the many treaties that major military powers (ie; the USA, PRC, Russian federation etc.) have conveniently failed to sign or rectify. Said nations often prioritise their own potential military advancements over such treaties, limiting the efficacy of international definitions of morality.

While it is not up to this essay to decide whether international law should remain relevant in the definition of morality, it hopes to define the boundaries more clearly by considering the perspectives of all involved parties, even the perpetrators.

Arms procurement

Firstly, war crimes have to occur through means — weapons. Exactly how moral would it be to develop more efficient tools to harm others? From rudimentary clubs and swords of the bronze and iron ages to lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) of today, humanity has only gotten more conversant over how to eliminate those they are at odds with. From a Kantian and a pacifist point of view, procurement of more effective arms is but an abject evil which is an affront to the principles of humanity and nonviolence. International law seems to agree with this too, with various treaties previously listed above having had (failed) goals of limiting and preventing the procurement and usage of weapons of mass destruction or indiscriminate damage. In the pragmatic world we live in however, governments have much more to consider rather than the sectarian safety of individuals or even enemy combatants. While yes, indiscriminate weapons might cause unnecessary suffering and/or target non-combatants, they also make the job for militaries much easier, putting personnel at less risk. This is evident from recent examples in history such as the usage of white phosphorus by Israel in the Gaza conflicts of 2008 and the Battle of Fallujah involving the United States. While the usage of white phosphorus incendiaries is indeed prohibited due to the risk of indiscriminate burns, this has not deterred belligerents from “conveniently” using them for signalling purposes (which is allowed). Russia and Ukraine have both also taken to using cluster munitions in recent months, despite the CCM. One could also argue that new armaments could solve or discourage conflicts as seen with nuclear bombs and parity.  The abject suffering of one does not outweigh the safety and efficiency of such controversial armaments. 

Legal Greys

Means of murder aside, a crime also depends on the perpetrator. While less debatable than procurement of more efficient arms, (for unwarranted maiming is generally accepted as wrong), the legal definition of such acts as well as the permissibility of certain prosecutions are often up for debate. One area of contention would be the legal definition of combatants, with the Geneva Convention vaguely phrasing combatants as “members of national armed forces or organized groups placed under the effective control of those forces” in the 1977 Additional Protocols. Given such a definition, the Geneva Conventions does not recognise the status of lawfulness for combatants in conflicts not involving two or more nation states, such as during civil wars between government's forces, and insurgents. This had led to incidents such as the Guantanamo Bay Detainees and mistreatment in the Chechen wars whereby individuals were not given the treatment expected of non-combatants or prisoners of war due to them being labelled as insurgents. The same definition also leaves civilians susceptible to governmental crackdowns, with nations usually relying on their constitutions to prevent governmental overstep in such cases albeit to varying degrees of success.

The prosecution of war crimes has also been subjected to narrative revisionism or censorship by the perceived victors. This is visible when a majority of indictees and warrants tend to pertain to members of the nation who had lost the conflict, such as those in the Yugoslav Wars and Ukraine, Multiple tribunaries even go as far as to arrest a majority of political leaders, crippling the political ability of the said losing belligerent. 

Besides prosecution, the definition of crimes and torture is often easily bypassed by exploiting definitions. Given the vague niched definitions of combatants, paramilitary forces, insurgents and even peacetime security forces have often been mistreated or downright tortured such as during the Columbian conflicts, Mexican Cartel Wars or the Iraq War. Many belligerents have also argued for their right to torture, with American forces citing waterboarding incidents as “enhanced interrogation techniques” for the sake of operational advantage. Once again, the operational benefit is not overweighed by the moral burden for the other. 

It is hard to argue that belligerents have nothing to gain for moving into this grey area, nations even employ contractors and private military companies (PMC) to achieve clandestine gains under largely legal boundaries. This is evident from the use of civilian contractors by the U.S. military and other armed forces in the conflicts in  Iraq and Afghanistan, blurring the lines between traditional military personnel and civilians. Incidents involving contractors, including allegations of abuse and misconduct, raised questions about their legal status under the Geneva Conventions and their accountability for potential violations. The Russian Wagner Group and various Chinese security forces have also allowed the aggrandizement of geopolitical spheres for both China and Russia in Africa, with minimal direct political burden on the actual armed forces of both countries. Such PMCs are not bound to the same operating clauses as the conventional military and have been involved in various questionable acts such as the torture of political opposition and clandestine strike operations. 

Conclusion

As much as international law attempts to impose an objective right and wrong, “the case against the notion of historical objectivity is like the case against international law, or international morality — it does not exist”. There will never be objective international morality as international law will never benefit all belligerents equally. Take a look around, how many allegations of war crimes are being thrown by the mainstream media at Russian troops in Ukraine and its PMCs in Ukraine? How many similar allegations are being made against the Ukrainians or the Israelis? Case in point, it serves the interest of nations to be immoral not only during impassioned moments or cases under duress but also when it blatantly gives them an objective benefit. 

When lives are on the line, there will be no objective moral rights. War does not decide who is right, it decides who is left.